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INTRODUCTION 
Thi^ r a s e a r i s e s from t h e p u r c h a s e by Golwix P r o p e r t i e s of 
c e r t a i n |" J r < "e 1 s o f <"ommerei 11 p r o p e r t \ * > nm ' n 
c( Mil pJi.lidLsir ' , , j | , wiii» governed by an agreement d a t e d 
May 2 2 , 1 t»B4 (t hr "Agreement " ) which i no] uded e x p r e s s 
w a r r a n t i e s nf q u a l i f y aim a i i t i a i l i i i i i '< >mni l i im 'in m >/ 
Sld< sy aq i i ' i i i i n i c p a i i and i i id inta in w a t e r t i g h t t h e i 
o f f i c e roo f fo r a 67 month p e r i o d l o j i n w i n q f hn ' " ^ l e . 
T h e I J ,, A i , i 1 K in i J i ii i
 (» i i |M< * ( , r . - y i n , •!,»! j an e x p r e s s 
w a r r a n t y c o n c e r n i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n of aii a i r - c o n d i t i o n i n g ' u n i t 
at" t h e Oqden pos t o f f i c e and t h a t S t a r d 
ma i nil a in ill I III |iiii 1 n f lK ' i J oul a s r equ .M,u * - i n ' t n e 
'i it eement The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s award ,-t damage*- ve t - ^ s p e o t 
t-> such b r e a c h e s , however, 1 \ i 1 od ' . u 
i i ioasutr , in . j II iiiq jii an aw.iid t o G«L ; v * v1? ,\ » POT ' ^n f 
t h e a c t u a l damages s u f f e r e d and p roven a t t r i a l In a i imit i II 
t h e D i s t r i c t Com t (a i i n i I n ,n, n i ill il w\w i ,. i I L» c o s t s and 
a t t o r n e y ' s t e e s a s i c q u i r e d by t h e t e r m s of t h e Agreement . 
in H l i r i e l HI r e s p o n s e ^o t h e c r o s s a p p e a l , Si 
-. guec Lhul , " I I Ii*
 fiH,itail iqr «! damages awarded t o o * i > , 
a l t h o u g h l e s s t h a n t h e a c t u a l damages s u f f e r e d , was somehow 
excessive, and (2) the Agreement does not provide any basis for 
awarding attorney's fees to Golwix. The authorities relied 
upon by Stacey reinforce the conclusion that the trial court's 
measure of damages did not compensate Golwix for Stacey7s 
breaches of the Agreement. Moreover, the unequivocal terms of 
the Agreement provide for an award of attorney's fees incurred 
by Golwix in successfully enforcing its claims. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES FAILED TO PLACE 
GOLWIX PROPERTIES IN AS GOOD A POSITION AS IF THE CONTRACT 
HAD BEEN PERFORMED. 
The first issue raised by Golwix' cross appeal is 
whether the trial court applied the correct measure of damages. 
Stacey does not dispute the legal standard set forth in 
Golwix's initial brief that recoverable damages include "those 
which arise naturally from the breach and which reasonably may 
be supposed to have been within the contemplation of the 
parties or are reasonably foreseeable." Robbins v. Finley, 645 
P.2d 623, 625 (Utah 1982); see Cross Appellants' Brief at 28. 
Stacey cites with approval the case of Alexander v. Brown, 646 
P.2d 692 (Utah 1982), in which this Court stated the general 
rule regarding the correct measure of damages: "Damages are 
properly measured by the amount necessary to place the 
nonbreaching party in as good a position as if the contract 
would have been performed." Id. at 695. 
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The only point of disagreement among the parties to 
this appeal therefore appears to be whether the trial court 
properly applied the foregoing measure of damages. As set 
forth in Golwix,s initial brief, the fractional awards granted 
by the trial court with respect to the air conditioner and the 
post office roof failed to place Golwix in as good a position 
as if the contract had been performed. The awards excluded 
substantial actual damages that were reasonably foreseeable and 
within the contemplation of the parties at the time they 
entered into the Agreement. 
Stacey avoids addressing Golwix,s arguments directly in 
its opposing brief. Instead, Stacey now raises, for the first 
time, a totally new position — that the trial court's damage 
awards were excessive. The arguments supporting Stacey's 
belated excessiveness position are threefold. First, Stacey 
argues that certain "as is" language contained in the Agreement 
should be construed to limit the express warranty concerning 
the air-conditioning unit and the clear covenants to maintain 
watertight the Ogden post office roof. Second, Stacey attempts 
to challenge the trial court's factual findings concerning 
Stacey's breach of warranty concerning the air-conditioning 
unit. Third, Stacey challenges the trial court's factual 
findings that it breached its covenent to maintain the post 
office roof. As will be demonstrated below, each of these 
arguments is entirely without merit. 
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A. The "As Is" Language in the Agreement Does Not Limit 
Express Warranties and Covenants, 
From the beginning in this case, Stacey has 
attempted to justify its breaches of warranty and contract by 
relying on language contained in paragraph 1 of the Agreement 
which provides: "The properties have been inspected by 
[Golwix] and are purchased 'as is7." Stacey's arguments 
concerning that language were correctly rejected by the trial 
court as having no effect upon the express warranties and 
covenants contained in the Agreement. Stacey's renewed attempt 
to hide behind this language should not be permitted by this 
Court. 
The law is clear that the phrase "as is" does not 
limit in any way other express provisions contained in the same 
agreement. In Tibbetts v. Openshaw, 18 Utah 2d 442, 425 P.2d 
160 (1967), this Court recognized, by analogy to the Uniform 
Commercial Code ("UCC"), that words creating an express 
warranty and words limiting warranties should be construed as 
consistent with each other. See id. at 162; Utah Code Ann. § 
70-A-2-316(l) (1980). Under the UCC, all "implied warranties 
are excluded by expressions like 'as is7 . . . ." Utah Code 
Ann. § 70-A-2-316(3)(a) (1980). Because the Agreement in this 
case contains express warranties and covenants as well as the 
"as is" language, the only logical and consistent construction 
is that the parties intended to exclude implied warranties of 
quality and provide other express warranties and covenants. 
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See, e.g.. Tenwick v. Bvrd, 9 Ark. App. 340, 659 S.W. 2d 950 
(1983); Society National Bank v. Remberton, 63 Ohio Misc. 26, 
409 N.E. 2d 1073 (1979); J. White & R. Summers, Uniform 
Commercial Code § 12-3 (2d ed. 1980). 
In the Agreement, Stacey made the following express 
warranty: "We represent and warrant to you that all heating, 
cooling, electrical, plumbing, and sewer systems at the 
property are in working order and will be operative at 
closing." (Findings and Conclusions para. 8, R-498 (emphasis 
added.)) Moreover, Stacey expressly agreed to "perform all 
necessary repairs to the roof of the post office building which 
are reasonably required to maintain a watertight roof surface 
for a period of 67 months from the date of closing . . . ." 
(Id.) These express warranties and covenants were a 
significant inducement to the transaction and can in no way be 
diminished by the disclaimer of implied warranties contained in 
the Agreement. 
B. Golwix was Entitled, at Least, to an Award of Damages 
Equal to the Cost of Putting the Air-Conditioning Unit 
in Working Order. 
The uncontroverted evidence at trial demonstrated 
that Golwix was forced to incur the actual cost of $22,758 to 
replace an air-conditioning unit that could not have been made 
operative without incurring a repair cost of $19,000 to 
$20,000. (Findings and Conclusions para. ll.a(5), R-499; 
TR-211-12; TR-215.) Of course, Golwix selected the only 
economically reasonable path and replaced the unit for slightly 
5 
more than the necessary repair cost. Stacey presented 
absolutely no evidence at trial indicating that it had made any 
efforts to repair the unit after receiving notice that the unit 
was not operative. Moreover, Stacey presented no evidence 
concerning repair or replacement cost. Nevertheless, Stacey 
now argues that the trial court's factual findings concerning 
the condition of the unit were incorrect. Stacey7s argument 
ignores the substantial burden necessary to overcome the trial 
court's express factual findings and urges an untenable 
construction of the express warranty. 
In Lemon v. Coatesf 54 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (March 27, 
1987), this Court recently recognized the superior position of 
the trial court in making factual findings: 
It was the function of the Judge, 
acting as the trier of fact, to decide 
which evidence was more credible on 
this issue. We may not disturb the 
Judge's findings unless they are 
clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a). Plaintiff has not met this 
burden. 
Id. (emphasis added.) Similarly, in Shioii v. Shioiif 712 P.2d 
197 (Utah 1985) , this court noted that, 
on appeal from a judgment of the trial 
court, our role is not to substitute 
our own findings for those of the trial 
court, but to examine the record for 
evidence supporting the judgment. 
Id. at 201. 
In the face of the clearly erroneous standard of 
review for factual findings, Stacey makes the same argument 
that it did to the trial court. Stacey argues that the 
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evidence at trial indicated that the air-conditioning unit was 
operative on May 22, 1984. Stacey makes a further evidentiary 
argument concerning an unsuccessful repair attempted by Golwix 
shortly after the closing date, which resulted in an 
expenditure of $1,030.34. Indeed, Stacey goes so far as to 
argue that Golwix's damage award should be limited to that 
expenditure. The evidence concerning these fact issues, 
however, was ruled upon by the trial court against Stacey. 
Stacey has not and cannot meet the heavy burden of 
demonstrating that the trial court's findings were clearly 
erroneous. 
The trial court made the following findings: 
(1) The air-conditioning unit, 
according to the circumstantial 
evidence presented, was not in working 
order and was not operative on May 22, 
1984; 
(4) Plaintiff was notified by Eugene 
Perrin of the post office by at least 
May 29, 1984 that the air-conditioning 
unit was not operable. Plaintiff and 
J. Ron Stacey failed to make repairs to 
the unit after receiving notice from 
the post office that the unit was 
inoperable; 
(5) Defendants incurred a total 
expense of $22,758.00 to replace the 
air-conditioning unit, the first 
installment of which in the amount of 
$6,000 was paid on August 21, 1984. 
(Findings and Conclusions para. 11.a., R-499.) These findings 
are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
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Mr. Eugene Perrin, the Ogden post office 
maintenance supervisor, testified that prior to May 22, 1984 he 
contacted Stacey to check the units before turning the 
air-conditioning on for the summer season. (TR-109-10.) Mr. 
Perrin started the unit on a weekend and on Tuesday, May 29, 
1984 (apparently after the long Memorial Day weekend) Mr. 
Perrin noticed that the unit was not operating. (TR-111-12; 
TR-557-59.) Mr. Arthur Smith, another post office maintenance 
employee, testified that he was "positive" that the air 
conditioner had not "worked at all" before Stacey was notified 
that the unit was inoperable. (TR-154.) Stacey presented 
absolutely no evidence that the air conditioner was in working 
order and operative on May 22, 1984. 
Mr. Perrin telephoned Stacey on May 29, 1984 to 
report the failure and sent a follow up letter requesting 
repairs. (TR-111, 113-14; Exhibit D-3.) Stacey did not 
investigate the failure and offered no repairs. (TR-63-64; 
TR-155; Exhibit D-4.) The evidence further indicated that 
Golwix requested the Holbrook Company to repair the unit 
shortly after the property purchase. (TR-171.) Because 
repeated leaks in the condensor coil over the years had 
resulted in serious damage to the compressor unit and other 
parts of the system, those repairs were unsuccessful. 
(TR-208-210).1 The leaks in the coil were caused by a design 
1
 The fact that the repairs were unsuccessful is further 
supported by Arthur Smith's testimony: 
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defect which had caused the coil to leak repeatedly over the 
years resulting in the ultimate demise of the unit. (TR-210, 
224-25.) Golwix reasonably followed the advice of the 
air-conditioning experts and replaced the unit due to the fact 
that the repair cost would nearly equal the cost of a new unit. 
(TR-211-12.) The substantial evidence presented by Golwix on 
this issue led the trial court to the only reasonable 
conclusion that the unit was not in working order and operative 
at the date of closing. 
Unable to challenge the evidence, Stacey now argues 
that the language of the warranty concerning the 
air-conditioning unit was limited to a single day. Incredibly, 
Stacey contends that it "did not warrant the operability or 
condition of the air-conditioning units for one day beyond the 
Q. Did the Air Conditioner work after Holbrook did 
whatever they did? 
A. I don't recall it ever working . . . . 
Q. Were you at the Post Office during the entire 
summer of 1984? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall the east air conditioner unit working 
at any time during that summer? 
A. I don't — the next time I recall the air 
conditioner working is when they put the new one 
in. I believe that was sometime in August. 
(TR-157.) 
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date of closing, May 22, 1984." Brief of Cross Respondents at 
8. Such a narrow construction of the language of the Agreement 
is unreasonable and was properly rejected by the trial court. 
By the express language of the Agreement, Stacey represented 
and warranted that the cooling system was "in working order and 
will be operative at closing." There is nothing in that 
language limiting the duration of the warranty to one single 
day. The phrase "will be operative at closing" does not limit 
the duration of the warranty but merely places a deadline on 
Stacey to perform needed maintenance and repairs. That 
construction is reinforced by the use of the term "working 
order", which does not refer to the date of closing. The term 
"working order" plainly suggests a cooling system that was ~ 
functioning properly at the time the representation and 
warranty was made and that would continue to provide 
satisfactory cooling for a reasonable period of time. 
Stacey contends that Golwix had a duty to inspect 
the air-conditioning unit to determine its probable life. The 
representation and warranty that the cooling system was in 
working order and would be operative, however, relieved Golwix 
of any duty of inspection. See Brief of Cross Appellants at 
29. Moreover, cross respondent J. Ron Stacey admitted at trial 
that an identical companion air-conditioning unit at the Ogden 
post office had failed the year before, requiring replacement 
of the coil at a cost in excess of $9,000. (TR-61-62.) That 
fact was exclusively within the knowledge of Stacey and was not 
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disclosed to Golwix. (Id.) If any party had a duty, Mr. 
Stacey, who is an experienced contractor (TR-49), had the duty 
to disclose to Golwix the precarious condition of the 
air-conditioning unit. Stacey should not now be heard to argue 
that Golwix had a duty to inspect the unit in light of the 
express representation and warranty and Mr. Stacey's personal 
knowledge of the defects that caused the failure. 
The only error of the trial court concerning the 
air-conditioning unit was its failure to fully compensate 
Golwix for its actual loss. This Court has observed that: 
The determination of the trial court on 
damages will not be reversed if it is 
supported by substantial evidence in 
the record. We will, however, reverse 
a trial court if there is a 
misapplication of the law to the 
established facts. 
Bitzes v. Sunset Oaks, Inc., 649 P.2d 66, 71 (Utah 1982). The 
trial court's findings that Golwix incurred the actual cost of 
$22,758 to replace an air-conditioning unit that was not in 
working order and was not operative at the date of closing was 
supported by substantial evidence. The trial court, however, 
misapplied the law to those established facts. An award of a 
percentage of the damages failed to put Golwix in the position 
of having an air-conditioning unit that was in working order 
and operative. The only way the warranted result could be 
achieved was by repairing the unit at substantial cost or 
replacing the unit for a nearly equal cost. This Court should 
therefore remand the case for entry of an award of damages 
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equal to the cost of replacing the unit, or at the very least, 
the cost of the necessary repairs. 
C. Stacey Failed to Honor its Covenant to Repair and 
Maintain the Post Office Roof for the Entire 
Contract Term. 
As Stacey points out in its opposing brief, Judge 
Roth agreed with the evidence and concluded that the Ogden post 
office roof needed replacement in order for the roof to be 
watertight. See Brief of Cross Respondents at 12-13. As owner 
of the post office building and as the contractor who had 
constructed the building initially (TR-50), Stacey was well 
aware of the roof's condition. It is entirely foreseeable and 
within the contemplation of the parties that the roof could 
completely fail during the contract term.2 As set forth in 
Golwix's opening brief, the evidence presented at trial (with 
which Judge Roth concededly agreed) indicated that the roof had 
indeed completely failed, but Stacey had not maintained the 
roof in a watertight condition and could not do so for the 
remainder of the contract term. Therefore, the only award that 
could have placed Golwix in the same position as if the 
contract were performed was an award of damages sufficient to 
enable Golwix to put the roof in a watertight condition. The 
2
 Notably, Stacey did not raise, at trial, the 
affirmative defenses of mistake, impossibility, or frustration 
of purpose on which it now appears to rely and upon which the 
trial court appears to have based its judgment. 
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only evidence presented at trial on this issue indicated that 
the replacement cost for a comparable roof was $43,750.3 
Stacey argues that the trial court's award of a 
percentage of the actual damages should be reduced even further 
to provide a credit for repairs that Stacey made during the 
initial months of the warranty period. That argument is wholly 
without merit and completely ignores the trial court's factual 
findings. Based on the substantial evidence presented, the 
trial court found that: 
The Ogden post office roof has leaked 
on numerous occasions following closing 
and plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey have 
failed to perform all necessary repairs 
which were reasonably required to 
maintain a watertight roof surface; 
(Findings and Conclusions para. 11.c.) Indeed, the evidence 
indicated that the roof had leaked incessantly since the date 
Golwix purchased the property and that it would continue to do 
so throughout the remainder of the contract term. (TR-120-29, 
159-60, 279-80, 284-94, Exhibit D-23.) 
The minimal efforts taken by Stacey during the 
initial portion of the contract period were unsuccessful. 
J
 Stacey contends that Golwix is manipulating, on appeal, 
the evidence on this point to its advantage for purposes of 
this appeal. See Brief of Cross Respondents at 14 n.3. As the 
record indicates, however, Golwix7s claim at trial was for an 
award of $43,750. (Findings and Conclusions para. 9(c), 
R-498.) If the trial court's measure of damages is upheld by 
this Court, the amount claimed by Golwix should be used in the 
calculation. See Brief of Respondents and Cross Appellants at 
33-34. 
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Moreover, the evidence indicated that the prior leaks had 
resulted in numerous problems and damages to Golwix. Based on 
the sustantial evidence presented, Judge Roth found that Stacey 
had breached the covenant for the entire contract period prior 
to trial. Consequently, there is no factual basis for giving 
Stacey a credit for whatever unsuccessful repairs may have been 
performed. 
The contractual agreement to repair and maintain 
the roof was an essential part of the real estate transaction. 
Golwix's cash flow projections and economic evaluations, upon 
which it based its purchase decision, assumed that the building 
would be free of expenses related to roof problems during that 
period. (TR-431-32.) By awarding Golwix only a percentage of 
the cost of a new roof, the trial court's award did not put 
Golwix in the same position as if the contract had been fully 
performed.4 The only award that could do so would be an award 
of the cost of replacing the roof. 
II. THE EXPRESS TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT PROVIDE FOR AN AWARD 
OF ATTORNEYS FEES TO GOLWIX PROPERTIES. 
Stacey does not and cannot argue that Golwix was not 
the prevailing party with respect to a substantial number of 
its counterclaims at trial. Instead, Stacey argues that 
4
 In fact, the award placed Golwix in a worse position. 
Stacey was relieved of all obligations regarding the roof, 
leaving Golwix with the need to make enormous capital 
expenditure to place the roof in watertight condition. 
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Section 17 of the Agreement fails to provide any basis for an 
award of attorney's fees. Stacey carefully avoids, however, 
citing the language of the Agreement. 
In paragraph 17, Stacey specifically agreed to 
"indemnify, defend, and hold [Golwix] harmless and reimburse 
[Golwix] on demand" for "reasonable attorney's fees and 
expenses, and costs and expenses reasonably incurred, in 
investigating, preparing, or defending against any litigation 
or claim . . • relating or attributable to" among other things 
"the enforcement of [Golwix's] rights under this Agreement." 
That language is plain and understandable. Stacey agreed to 
indemnify and reimburse Golwix for attorney's fees and costs 
incurred in enforcing its rights under the Agreement. Stacey 
argues that because Section 17 is labeled "indemnity" that it 
is limited only to claims asserted by third parties. That 
argument ignores the express language of the Agreement. If the 
parties had intended to limit the scope of Section 17 to claims 
asserted by third parties, they certainly could have stated 
that intention. To the contrary, the parties expressly agreed 
that Stacey would indemnify and reimburse Golwix for attorney's 
fees incurred in "any litigation" in which Golwix enforces its 
rights under the Agreement. 
Finally, Stacey argues that if Section 17 applies, 
Golwix is entitled only to attorney's fees incurred in 
enforcing its breach of contract claims and not its offset 
claims asserted under the promissory note. Such a distinction 
15 
is false and without any basis. All of Golwix's counterclaims 
in this action are based upon breaches of Stacey's warranties 
and covenants contained in the Agreement. Simply because 
Golwix chose to exercise its offset rights against the 
promissory note in no way diminishes or alters the source of 
its claims. 
In Trainer v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984), a case 
relied upon by Stacey, this Court held that, "Where the parties 
have agreed by contract to the payment of attorney's fees, the 
court may award reasonable fees in accordance with the terms of 
the parties' agreement." Id. at 858. Stacey agreed to pay 
Golwix's attorney's fees incurred in enforcing its rights under 
the Agreement and Golwix is entitled to such an award. The 
case should be remanded to permit Golwix to present evidence 
concerning the attorney's fees it incurred in vindicating its 
rights under the Agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and in Golwix's opening 
brief, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and 
remanded with directions (1) to enter an award of damages to 
place Golwix in as good a position as if the contract had been 
performed with respect to the air-conditioning unit and the 
post office roof, and (2) to award Golwix its attorney's fees 
incurred in enforcing its rights under the Agreement. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of June, 1987. 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
Ronald/G. Russell 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Counterclaimants 
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